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BURDEN OF PROOF OF BAILEE'S NEGLIGENCE IN
CONNECTION WITH HIS FAILURE TO REDELIVER
By RoBERT M. SwEET
If you were the trial judge, given the following facts in an action in
assumpsit by a bailor against his bailee for failure to redeliver the bailed
goods upon demand, how would you instruct as to who has the burden of
persuasion on the issue of the bailee's negligence (or exercise of due care)
in connection with the loss of the bailed property?
Evidenced adduced by the plaintiff has established that the defendant
company operates a service and repair garage for trucks and that plain-
tiff's driver had left plaintiff's truck with the defendant company for repair.
After the plaintiff's truck was repaired, it was parked on a lot owned by
defendant adjacent to their service garage, which lot was also used by tran-
sient drivers stopping for food and lodging. The keys to plaintiff's truck,
and other trucks similarly parked, were kept during the day in defendant's
parts room and at night in a gasoline service station also operated by the
defendant. When plaintiff's driver returned to claim the truck three days
later, it could not be found and state and local authorities were notified
that it had been stolen. The plaintiff did not allege that the loss was occa-
sioned by the defendant's negligence, but their evidence has established
that the defendant was unable to redeliver the truck because it had been
stolen.
If, considering the facts just presented, you non-suited the plaintiff on
the ground that since the plaintiff's evidence established that the defendant
was unable to redeliver because the truck had been stolen, the burden was
upon the plaintiff to introduce evidence and to persuade the triers of fact
that the theft was occasioned by the defendant's negligence, and the plain-
tiff had failed to sustain these burdens, you are in accord with the trial
judge whose ruling was the subject of appeal in the case of Moss v. Bailey
Sales and Service Inc.' The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the
trial court's ruling, holding that although the plaintiff did not allege de-
fendant's negligence in connection with the theft, the plaintiff destroyed
his prima facia case by introducing evidence showing that the defendant
was unable to redeliver because the truck had been stolen. In addition, the
court said that had the plaintiff not introduced evidence of the cause of the
loss but rather just established his prima facia case by alleging and prov-
ing delivery and failure to redeliver, it would then have been incumbent
upon the defendant bailee to prove that he was unable to redeliver because
the truck had been stolen, and that such a theft was not inconsistant with
the exercise of due care on his part. The court further said, citing American
Jurisprudence' and Corpus Jurus Secundum,3 that no inference or pre-
1385 Pa. 547, 123 A.2d 425 (1956).
2 6 Am. Jui., Bailments, § 372 (Rev. ed. 1950).
s8 C.JS., Bailments, § 50 (1938).
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sumption of negligence arises from the fact that the bailed property is
stolen while in the bailee's possession, although the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court did recognize that in the more recent decisions in other jurisdictions,
such a loss ordinarily does raise such an inference or presumption.
Apparently the decision in the principal case is in accord with prece-
dents set in earlier Pennsylvania decisions,4 and the court in the principal
case stated that:
"If a bailee for hire in Pennsylvania is to be made an insurer of the prop-
erty committed to his custody" . . (which result the court attributed to
the "modern rule" that loss of the bailed property by fire or theft while in
possession of the bailee raises a presumption of the bailee's negligence)
... "it is preferable ... that such change be made by the legislature .... 5
There is much conflict in the decisions dealing with the questions of
who has the burden of persuasion on the issue u; the bailee's negligence in
actions by a bailor against his bailee for failure to redeliver, and what
effect, if any, loss by fire or theft has upon the burden of introducing evi-
dence." The conflicting decisions can be roughly grouped into four general
categories:
(1) Cases in which the results differ, in various degrees, because of the
inconsistency of the courts in interpreting and utilizing such phrases as
burden of proof, prima facia case, inference and presumption of negligence.
The cases are in accord insofar as placing the burden of introducing evi-
dence and the burden of persuasion on the bailor in establishing delivery
of the chattel to the bailee and his subsequent failure to redeliver on de-
mand.' Most courts say that this is prima facia evidence of the bailee's
liability.' If the bailor's action is based on breach of the bailment contract
or in the nature of trover for conversion there is general agreement that
not only must the bailee introduce evidence establishing the reason for his
failure to redeliver (such as loss by theft or fire) but also he must show
that such loss was not inconsistent with the exercise of due care on his
part.9 If the bailor in his action alleges the negligence of the bailee in con-
nection with the loss, the great majority of the decisions place the burden
4 Toole v. Miller, 375 Pa. 509, 99 A.2d 897 (1953) ; Anderson v. Murdock Storage & Trans-
fer Co., Inc., 371 Pa. 212, 88 A.2d 720 (1952) ; Yeo v. Miller North Board Storage Co., 146 Pa.
Super. 408, 23 A.2d 79 (1941) ; Schell v. Miller North Board Storage Co., 142 Pa.Super. 293,
16 A.2d 680 (1940).
S385 Pa. at ........, 123 A.2d at 429.
6 BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY § 87 (2d ed. 1955) ; 6 AM. JUR., Baillnents, § 364 (Rev. ed.
1950); 8 C.J.S. Bailments, § 50 (1938); DEc. DIG., Bailments, § 31 (1).
7 Threlkeld v. Breaux Ballard, Inc., 296 Ky. 344, 177 S.W.2d 157 (1944); Ullmann v.
Fuerth, 269 N.Y. Supp. 25, 150 Misc. 125 (1933); Chouinard v. Berube, 124 Me. 75, 126 A.
180 (1924).
8 Southern R. Co. v. Prescott, 240 U.S. 632 (1916); Lederer v. Railway Terminal &
Warehouse Co., 346 Ill. 140, 178 N.E. 394 (1931) ; Traders Compress Co. v. Precure, 140 Okla.
40,282 Pac. 165 (1929).
9 Newton Chevrolet Co. v. Canle, 31 Tenn. App. 67, 212 S.W.2d 392 (1948); Lebens v.
Wolf, 138 Minn. 435, 165 N.W. 276 (1917); Stone v. Case, 34 Okla. 5, 124 Pac. 960 (1912);
Knights v. Piella, 111 Mich. 9, 69 N.W. 92 (1896).
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of persuasian as to this issue on the bailor.10 Some courts say that from the
bailee's failure to redeliver, the triers of the fact are free to consider an
inference of the bailee's negligence, thus making the bailee vulnerable to
the risk of an adverse decision if he does not introduce evidence of his due
care." Other courts say that such failure to redeliver raises a presumption
of the bailee's negligence, thus thrusting upon the bailee the burden of in-
troducing countervailing evidence if he is to escape a peremptory ruling. 2
If the bailee seeks to escape liability by showing that his inability to re-
deliver was due to loss of the bailed chattel through fire or theft, some
courts hold that such a showing thrusts upon the bailor the burden of going
forward with the evidence of the bailee's negligence," while others contend
that an inference 4 or presumption" of negligence arises from the fact that
failure to redeliver was so caused. If the bailor's evidence establishes that
the bailed goods were lost through fire or theft, etc., many decisions have
held that the bailor's prima facia case is extinguished and it then becomes
incumbent on him to affirmatively establish the bailee's negligence if he is
to escape a non-suit. 6 Still other cases, in what seems to be a very desirable
trend in the more modern decisions, hold that by introducing evidence of
loss by fire or theft, etc., the bailor does not destroy his prima facia case
nor does the bailee overcome the inference or rebutt the presumption of
his negligence by so attempting to explain his failure to redeliver.'1
(2) Cases in which the answer to the question of who has the burden
of persuasion on the issue of the bailee's negligence is dictated by the form
of action chosen by the bailor. If the bailor does not allege that the bailee
has been negligent, but, rather, alleges only delivery and failure to redeliver
and bases his action on breach of the bailment contract, many decisions
hold that not only must the bailee prove that his failure to redeliver was
occasioned by the theft or destruction by fire of the bailed goods but also
that he has the burden of persuading the triers of fact that he exercised
due care in connection with the loss.' 8 If the bailor's action is in the nature
10 Commercial Molasses Corp. v. New York Tank Barge Corp., 314 U.S. 104 (1941);
Sanborn v. Kimball, 106 Me. 355, 76 A. 890 (1910).
11 Commercial Molasses Corp. v. New York Tank Barge Corp., 314 U.S. 104 (1941);
Carter v. Allenhurst, 100 N.J.L. 138, 125 A. 117 (1924); Colburn v. Washington State Art
Ass'n, 80 Wash. 662, 141 Par. 1153 (1914).
2 Lederer v. Railway Terminal & Warehouse Co., 346 Ill. 140, 178 N.E. 394 (1931);
Prince v. Alabama State Fair, 106 Ala. 340, 17 So. 449 (1895).
13Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Pacific Transfer Co., 120 Wash. 665, 208 Pac. 55
(1922) ; Colburn v. Washington State Art Ass'n, 80 Wash. 662, 141 Pac. 1153 (1914) ; Yazoo &
M. Valley R. Co. v. Hughes, 94 Miss. 242, 47 So. 662 (1908).
14 Downey v. Martin Aircraft Service, Inc., 96 CalApp.2d 94, 214 P.2d 581 (1950);
Threlkeld v. Breaux Ballard 296 Ky. 344, 177 S.W.2d 157 (1944); Gen. Exch. Ins. Corp. v.
Service Parking Grounds, 254 Mich. 1, 235 N.W. 898 (1931).
15 Ibid.
16 Delaware Dredging Co. v. Graham, 43 F.2d 852 (E.D. Pa. 1930) ; Glover v. Spraker,
50 Idaho 16, 292 Pac. 613 (1930); Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Dennis' Estate, 231 Mich. 367,
204 N.W. 89 (1925).
17 See 6 Am. JuR., Bailments, § 372 n. 12 (Rev. ed. 1950).
18 Wilson v. Calif. Cent. R. Co., 94 Cal. 166, 29 Pac. 861 (1892) ; Boles v. Hartford &
N.H.R. Co., 37 Conn. 272, 9 Am. Rep. 347 (1870).
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of trover alleging conversion by the bailee but not putting the bailee's neg-
ligence in issue, there is authority to the effect that in order to escape liabil-
ity the bailee has the burden of persuading that the property was lost,
stolen or destroyed without negligence on his part. 9
(3) Cases where the burden of persuasion on the issue of the bailee's
negligence is allocated by statute. Here the question is what change in the
common law rules is brought about by the Uniform Warehouse Receipts
Act. The sections pertinent to this discussion are sections 8 and 2 1, which
in effect provide that should a warehouseman subject to the terms of the
act fail to redeliver the bailed property upon demand, he must establish
the existence of a lawful excuse and further, he will be liable for losses
occasioned by his failure to exercise that degree of care that a reasonably
prudent man would exercise in caring for goods of his own of a similar
nature. The decisions construing the effect of these sections, in jurisdic-
tions where the Uniform Act is in effect, are not harmonious.' (a) Some
jurisdictions hold that the bailor has the burden of proving the bailee's neg-
ligence but that once he has established delivery and failure to redeliver
the burden of producing evidence in explanation shifts to the bailee ware-
houseman. If the bailee proves loss by fire or theft not inconsistent with
due care on his part, the burden of producing evidence then shifts back to
the bailor, requiring him to show that the negligence of the bailee contrib-
uted to the loss.2' (b) Other decisions have made the answer to the question
of who has the burden of persuasion on the issue of the bailee's negligence
dependent upon the form of action and pleadings.22 (c) In still other juris-
dictions the act has been interpreted as imposing upon the bailee ware-
houseman the burden of persuasion as to his exercise of due care irrespec-
tive of whether the bailor alleged his negligence in connection with the
loss.23
(4) Cases not falling within the purview of the Uniform Warehouse
Receipts Act where the burden of persuasion as to the issue of the exercise
or lack of due care is placed upon the defendant bailee for reasons of pol-
icy, fairness, and accessibility to evidentiary matter concerning the cir-
cumstances of the loss. In this area the burden would seem to be placed
on the bailee regardless of which form of action the bailor utilized.'
The California decisions reflect the divergent viewpoints already al-
luded to on a national basis. In the cases falling within the scope of the
19 Smith v. Maher, 84 Okla. 49, 202 Pac. 321 (1921); Fleischman v. Southern R. Co.,
76 S.C. 237, 56 S.E. 974 (1907).
20 See generally 13 A.L.R.2d 681 (1950).
21 Fry v. Wagner Bros. Moving & Storage Co., 267 S.W.2d 359 (Mo. 1954) ; Brown v.
Sloans' Moving & Storage Co., 247 S.W.2d 310 (Mo. 1954); Mims v. Hearon, 248 S.W.2d 754
(Tex. Civ. App. 1952).
22 See note 19 supra.
23 Shockley v. Tennyson Transfer & Storage, Inc., 76 Idaho 131, 278 P.2d 795 (1955);
Cole v. Younger, 58 N.M. 211, 269 P.2d 1096 (1954).
24 Agricultural Ins. Co. v. Constantine, 144 Ohio St. 275, 58 N.E.2d 658 (1944) ; BROwN,
PERSONAL PROPERTY, § 87 (2d ed. 1955).
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Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act,2  the earlier decisions seem to hold that
the burden of persuasion as to the issue of the bailee's negligence is upon
the bailor,2" although some have held that the question of who has the
burden is to be decided by the form of action and the pleadings.2 7 The
1949 case of George v. Bekins Van and Storage 8 seems to have resolved
the controversy, the Supreme court holding that the burden is upon the
bailee warehouseman to prove that the goods were not lost because of his
negligence, irrespective of the form of action or pleadings utilized by the
bailor depositor.
In those cases not controlled by the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act,
the apparently conflicting decisions seem to be reconcilable on the basis of
which form of action the bailor chose to utilize and what allegations, if any,
his pleadings made of the bailee's negligence.' The cases seem to be in
accord in holding that if the bailor alleges the bailee's negligence as the
cause of the loss, the burden of introducing evidence and the burden of
persuasion of such negligence are on the bailor."0 If, however, the bailor
bases his action on breach of bailment contract or on conversion by the
bailee, it would seem that not only has the bailee the burden of persuasion
in establishing that the goods were lost by fire, theft, or otherwise, but also
he must establish that such loss occurred without negligence on his part.31
It is believed that the California courts have taken a very desirable posi-
tion in holding that not only must the bailee establish the cause of loss, in
causes of action based on breach of contract or conversion, but also in
requiring him to prove, in cases of loss by fire or theft, etc., that such loss
was not due to his failure to exercise the requisite degree of care. Although
at the present time there is no decision holding directly that, in a suit not
within the scope of the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act in which the
bailor alleges the bailee's negligence, the burden of persuasion is on the
bailee to establish his exercise of due care, such would seem to be the trend.
This trend seems to be heralded by Justice Traynor in the case of Raber
v. Tumin3 2 where, in a dissenting opinion he said:
25 The Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act was adopted in California in 1909. See CAIF.
CIVI. CODE §§ 1858.17 and 1858.30.
28 England v. Lyon Fireproof Storage Co., 94 CalApp. 562, 271 Pac. 532 (1928); Atwood
v. Southern California Ice Co., 63 Cal.App. 343, 218 Pac. 283 (1923); Runkle v. Southern
Pacific Milling Co., 184 Cal. 714, 195 Pac. 398 (1921).
2 7 See Wilson v. Crown Transfer & Storage Co., 201 Cal. 701, 258 Pac. 596 (1927) review-
ing such cases.
233 Cal.2d 834, 205 P.2d 1037 (1949).
2 See generally 7 CAL.. Ju. 2d, Bailments, § 26 (1953).
SOU Drive & Tour, Ltd. v. System Auto Parks, Ltd., 28 CalApp.2d 782, 71 P.2d 354
(1937); Homan v. Burkhart, 108 CalApp. 363, 291 Pac. 624 (1930); England v. Lyon Fire-
proof Storage Co., 94 Cal.App. 562, 271 Pac. 532 (1928); Webber v. Bank of Tracy, 66
CalApp. 29, 225 Pac. 41 (1924).
81 Gardner v. Jonathan Club, 35 Cal.2d 343, 217 P.2d 961 (1950); Downey v. Martin
Aircraft Service, 96 CalApp.2d 94, 214 P.2d 581 (1950); Travelers Fire Ins. Co. v. Brock
& Co., 30 Cal. App.2d 112, 85 P.2d 905 (1938).
3236 Cal.2d 654, 226 P.2d 574 (1951).
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"When bailed goods are lost or destroyed, it is reasonable to require the
bailee to prove that the loss was not owing to his negligence.) 33
In Downey v. Martin Aircraft Service, 4 the court said that in view of the
George v. Bekins Van and Storage case it might appear that the rule placing
the burden on the bailee to prove that he was not negligent, irrespective
of the form of action utilized by the bailor, is applicable only in cases
arising under the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act but that the logic of
the rule is applicable to other bailee's who accept chattel for repair in the
expectation of profit. The holding of the court was that when a bailee is
unable to redeliver, not only must he show that the property was lost,
stolen or destroyed, but also, in order to escape liability, he must show
that there was no negligence on his part in connection with the loss. The
court further said, speaking through Presiding Justice White, that:
"It is just and fair that one who undertakes for reward to care for a chattel
should have the burden of explaining its loss or destruction while in his
custody . . .,35
In connection with the foregoing case, it should be noted that the bailor
alleged only delivery and failure to redeliver and not the the bailee had
been negligent.
In the case of Redfoot v. J. T. Jenkins Co.,36 the court recognized the
dictum in the Downey case to the effect that the burden should be on the
bailee to establish his freedom from negligence even though the case was
not within the purview of the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act and even
though the bailor alleged such negligence, but the court did not decide
the question squarely, holding that the dictum in the Downey case would
probably apply. The latest case in point illustrating this trend is Morgan
v. G. and N. Trucking Co.3 7 Here again the dictum in the Downey case was
alluded to but not pinned down, the court holding that even considering
the burden of persuasion to be upon the bailee, there was ample evidence
in this particular case from which the lower court could find that the
defendant bailee had not been negligent. Considering the foregoing Cali-
fornia cases, it would appear that a holding to the effect that the burden is
on the bailee to establish his freedom from negligence even though the
bailor alleged such negligence, can be expected sometime in the future.
How soon no one can say but such a decision would certainly seem to be
desirable.
A brief discussion of the relative merits, especially in reference to the
principal case, would seem to be appropriate in conclusion. In its decision
in Moss v. Bailey Sales and Service Inc., the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania concluded that the application of the so called "modern rule" (that
3 Id. at 664, 226 P.2d at 580.
34 96 Cal.App.2d 94, 214 P.2d 581 (1950).
M Id. at 100, 214 P.2d at 584.
3 138 Cal.App.2d 108, 291 P.2d 134 (1955).
37 139 Cal.App.2d 897, 294 P.2d 742 (1956).
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loss, theft, or destruction of the bailed goods while in the possession of the
bailee raises a presumption of his negligence) in effect made the bailee an
insurer of the property "committed" to his custody. This would hardly
seem to be the case, although in defense of this statement it might be said
that in Pennsylvania many decisions have taken the position that the one
against whom a presumption operates not only has the burden of intro-
ducing countervailing evidence but also the burden of persuasion of the
non-existence of the presumed fact.' Even considering the burden of per-
suasion to be upon the bailee in establishing his exercise of due care, the
result could hardly be that of making him an insurer. Since the bailor has
entrusted (and not merely "committed") his property to the custody of
the bailee and further since the bailee receives such possession in the expec-
tation of profit, on the grounds of desirable public policy it would cer-
tainly not seem unjust to require the bailee, when he is unable to redeliver
the property so entrusted to him, to establish his exercise of due care by
a preponderance of the evidence. In addition to the policy considerations
just mentioned, one might ask: who is in a better position to explain the
loss? Certainly not the bailor. He has delivered possession to the bailee
who takes control and determines the manner of keeping. In most cases
it would be almost impossible for the bailor to prove the bailee's negligence.
Accessability to evidence on the issue of due care would seem to be almost
exclusively the bailee's. Certainly requiring the bailee to establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that he has been free from culpable fault
in connection with the loss, theft or destruction of the bailed article does
not have the effect of making him an insurer of the goods.
It is conceded that the position, that the burden of persuasion as to the
exercise of due care should be on the bailee regardless of the form of action
or allegations utilized by the bailee, is one as yet adopted in only a few
decisions, in the absence of statutory provisions to that effect. Still, as
admitted in the principal case, the more recent decisions show a growing
tendency to hold that there is an inference or presumption of negligence on
the part of the bailee when the goods entrusted to him have been lost,
stolen or destroyed while in his possession. It is arguable whether, in the
light of human experience, it logically follows that the bailee has been neg.
ligent in such a situation but certainly it is a possibility that deserves con-
sideration. Regardless of the question of logical deduction, in the interests
of sound public policy and with the realization that access to evidence
of due care is almost exclusively the bailee's, it seems just and fair that
the bailee should have the burden of establishing his freedom from negli-
gence. If such a requirement seems too harsh, then at least the bailor
should have the benefit of the operation in his favor of a presumption of
the bailee's negligence.
3 8 McDonald v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 348 Pa. 558, 36 A.2d 492 (1944); Watkens v.
Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 315 Pa. 497, 173 A. 644, (1934).
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